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THE RACE TO PATENT THE SARS VIRUS: 
THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL 
MEDICINES 
The Race to Patent the SARS Virus 
MATTHEW RIMMER* 
[This article considers the race to sequence the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome virus (‘the 
SARS virus’) in light of the debate over patent law and access to essential medicines. Part II 
evaluates the claims of public research institutions in Canada, the United States, and Hong 
Kong, and commercial companies, to patent rights in respect of the SARS virus. It highlights the 
dilemma of ‘defensive patenting’ — the tension between securing private patent rights and 
facilitating public disclosure of information and research. Part III considers the race to patent 
the SARS virus in light of wider policy debates over gene patents. It examines the application of 
such patent criteria as novelty, inventive step, utility, and secret use. It contends that there is a 
need to reform the patent system to accommodate the global nature of scientific inquiry, the 
unique nature of genetics, and the pace of technological change. Part IV examines the role 
played by the World Trade Organization and the World Health Organization in dealing with 
patent law and access to essential medicines. The article contends that there is a need to ensure 
that the patent system is sufficiently flexible and adaptable to accommodate international 
research efforts on infectious diseases.] 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (‘SARS’)1 is a form of atypical 
pneumonia caused by a new strain of coronavirus (‘the SARS virus’).2 It was 
first reported in the Guangdong province in southern China in November 2002. 
The illness was first identified by Dr Carlo Urbani, an infectious diseases 
specialist for the World Health Organization (‘WHO’). He found that a patient in 
Vietnam was suffering from high fever, coughing and shortness of breath. Dr 
Urbani tragically lost his life to the disease a few weeks later. The outbreak 
spread from China to the important trade and transport hub, Hong Kong. From 
there, the illness was further spread by international air travel to another 19 
countries, including Taiwan, Singapore, Canada, Vietnam, the Philippines and 
the United States. The WHO reported that there were 8098 known cases and 774 
deaths attributable to the SARS virus in the period between 1 November 2002 
and 31 July 2003.3 The public health epidemic had a significant impact upon the 
global economy — especially in relation to trade, transport and tourism.4 It has 
been variously represented as a medieval plague, a medical disaster and an 
economic blight.5 
The rapid discovery of the SARS virus was coordinated by the WHO in 
Geneva. An international team of scientists and researchers was led by Klaus 
Stöhr, a virologist at the WHO. Stöhr comments that a closed network was 
established, in which data and information was shared within the group.6 He 
explains the nature of the collaboration:  
All laboratories asked to join agreed to do so and to work according to a set of 
rules on confidentiality of data. These rules specified that data and information 
shared among the members of the research project would be used only to advance 
the project in a collaborative way. Specific scientific data could be shared outside 
the network with the approval of the laboratory from which the data or other 
                                                 
 1 For an introduction to the scientific work on the SARS virus, see WHO, Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (2004) <http://www.who.int/csr/sars/en> at 1 October 2004;  
and Science, Special Online Collection: The SARS Epidemic (2004) 
<http://www.sciencemag.org/feature/data/sars> at 1 October 2004. 
 2 Merriam-Webster Medical Dictionary (2002): ‘A coronavirus is any of a family 
(Coronaviridae) of single-stranded RNA viruses that have a lipid envelope with club-shaped 
projections and include some causing respiratory symptoms in humans’. 
 3 The case fatality ratio for SARS was 9.6 per cent of all cases diagnosed. The worst affected 
countries included China, with 5327 diagnosed cases and 349 deaths; Hong Kong, with 
1755 diagnosed cases and 299 deaths; Taiwan, with 346 diagnosed cases and 37 deaths; and 
Singapore, with 238 diagnosed cases and 33 deaths. Across the Pacific, Canada was also 
severely affected, with 251 cases and 43 deaths: Communicable Disease, Surveillance and 
Response, WHO, Summary of Probable SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1 November 
2002 to 31 July 2003 (2003) <http://www.who.int/csr/sars/contry/table2003_09_23/en> at 
1 October 2004. 
 4 Jong-Wha Lee and Warwick McKibbin, ‘Globalization and Disease: The Case Of SARS’ 
(Working Paper No 2003/16, Division of Economics, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, The Australian National University, 2003) 8. 
 5 Abraham Verghese, ‘The SARS Epidemic: The Metaphor of Blight’, The Wall Street 
Journal (New York, US), 13 May 2003, A18. See also Susan Sontag, Illness as Metaphor 
(1978). 
 6 The WHO’s Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network was instrumental in the response 
to the SARS virus. See Bruce Sterling, ‘Guns, Germs, and Software: A Networked Strategy 
Can Defeat Epidemics — If the World Will Let It’ (2004) 12 Wired Magazine 4. 
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information originated … Such open sharing among academic competitors 
required trust and willingness to work together.7 
Scientists isolated a virus from patients who had SARS and then used several 
laboratory methods to look further at the agent. Examination by electron 
microscopy revealed that the virus had the distinctive shape and appearance of 
coronaviruses. Tests of blood specimens from patients with SARS showed that 
the patients appeared to have been infected recently with this coronavirus. Other 
tests demonstrated that a coronavirus was present in a variety of specimens from 
patients, including nose and throat swabs. Genetic analysis has raised questions 
about the origin of the SARS virus, including the possibility of an animal origin, 
such as the civet cat.8  
The network of institutions involved in SARS research has been hailed as a 
case study in international scientific collaboration. There was, however, some 
competition amongst the research groups to secure credit and commercial rights 
to their findings. Teams of scientists in Canada, Hong Kong and the US were 
able to sequence the SARS virus with remarkable speed.9 A number of public 
research institutions filed provisional patent applications in respect of the 
complete genetic sequence of the coronavirus. The main contenders included the 
British Columbia Cancer Agency (‘BCCA’), the US Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention (‘CDC’), and The University of Hong Kong (‘HKU’). The 
detailed claims in these applications, although not yet publicly available, are 
reported to be sufficiently broad to allow their holders to claim rights in most 
diagnostic tests, drugs, or vaccines that have been or would be developed to cope 
with the outbreak. 
This race to patent the SARS virus deserves closer analysis because of the 
wider debates about gene patenting and public health that it sparked in the 
international media.10 The case study provides a vivid illustration of the 
sometimes arid economic debate as to whether patent races are an efficient 
means of allocating resources in the marketplace.11 There are several positions 
discernible in the debate: the entrepreneurialism of biotechnology companies; the 
pragmatism of research institutions; the reformist tinkering of academics; and the 
ethical and moral objections of patent abolitionists. First of all, commercial 
companies argued that a strong patent system was essential to promote private 
investment and research into diagnostics, vaccines and pharmaceutical drugs. 
                                                 
 7 Klaus Stöhr and the WHO Multicentre Collaborative Network for SARS Diagnosis,  
‘A Multicentre Collaboration to Investigate the Cause of Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome’ (2003) 361 The Lancet 1730, 1731. 
 8 Martin Enserink, ‘Clues to the Animal Origins of SARS’ (2003) 300 Science 1351; Judy 
Skatsoon, ‘Civet Cats not the Original Source of SARS’, ABC Science News,  
5 October 2004 <http://www.abc.net.au/science/news/stories/s1213117.htm> at 5 October 
2004. The civet cat is a species of the mongoose family (family Viverridae) found in Africa 
and Asia.  
 9 Justin Gillis and Michael Barbaro, ‘SARS No Boon for Drug, Biotech Firms’, The 
Washington Post (Washington DC, USA), 17 April 2003, E01; Brian McGee, ‘Hong Kong, 
Canada, US Scientists File SARS Patents, WSJ Says’, Bloomberg Newsfeed, 5 May 2003. 
 10 For an introduction to patent law, practice, and policy in the field of genetics, see Australian 
Law Reform Commission, Genes and Ingenuity: Gene Patenting and Human Health,  
Report No 99 (2004). 
 11 See, eg, Joseph Zeira, Innovations, Patent Races and Endogenous Growth (2003) Yale 
Department of Economics <http://www.econ.yale.edu/seminars/macro/mac03/zeira-030304.pdf> 
at 1 October 2004. 
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Second, the business managers of research institutions reluctantly relied upon the 
patent system to engage in technology transfer and protect public access to 
scientific research. Third, academics such as Richard Gold12 and Peter Yu13 
argued that the race to patent the SARS virus revealed the need to reform the 
patent system. Finally, a number of idealists, such as Dr Marco Marra,14 
Margaret Atwood,15 and Jeremy Rifkin,16 expressed per se objections to the 
patenting of the genetic code of the SARS virus. Such complaints were grounded 
in ethical concerns about the commercialisation of scientific discoveries. 
In charting this debate over gene patenting and the SARS virus, this article 
unashamedly favours a reformist approach. It contends that there is a need to 
modernise patent law to better reflect the large scale and collaborative nature of 
scientific projects — such as the international network of research into the SARS 
virus. First, this article considers the race between Canadian, Hong Kong, and 
US government researchers, and biotechnology companies to patent the genetic 
sequence of the SARS virus. It critically evaluates the claims of public 
laboratories that they are engaged in ‘defensive patenting’ to secure public 
access to scientific information. It argues that public research institutions should 
be given greater incentive and encouragement to cooperate and share research, 
rather than being driven to engage in patenting of research in light of the 
Bayh-Dole Act (US).17 Second, this article considers the examination by the 
United States Patent and Trade Mark Office (‘USPTO’) of the patent 
applications in respect of the SARS virus and diagnostics. It evaluates the 
relevance of particular patent criteria in the US — such as patentable subject 
matter, novelty, inventive step, utility and secret use. It contends that there is a 
need to recalibrate such basic doctrinal concepts to better accommodate  
‘Big Science’18 projects. Third, this article considers the dispute over patent law 
and access to essential medicines. It evaluates whether the Agreement on  
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights19 and the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health20 are robust enough to 
deal with the emergence of new infectious diseases — such as the SARS virus. It 
                                                 
 12 See E Richard Gold, ‘SARS Genome Patent: Symptom or Disease?’ (2003) 361 The Lancet 2002. 
 13 See Peter Yu, ‘SARS and the Patent Race: An Introduction to the “Patent Law, Social 
Policy, and Public Interest” Symposium’ (2004) 22 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law 
Journal, available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=451640> at 1 October 2004. 
 14 Dirk Meissner, ‘SARS Gene Patent Application will Help Cure Research, Says BC Cancer 
Agency’, The Canadian Press Newsfeed, 5 May 2003 <http://cmbi.bjmu.edu.cn/news/ 
0305/71.htm> at 1 October 2004. 
 15 Sylvain-Jacques Desjardins, ‘Margaret Atwood: Back to the Future’ (2003) 35(15) McGill 
Reporter <http://www.mcgill.ca/reporter/35/15/atwood> at 1 October 2004. 
 16 Paul Elias, ‘Government, Companies Race to Patent SARS Virus, Raising Ethics 
Questions’, Associated Press Newsfeed, 6 May 2003. 
 17 Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, 35 USC §§ 200–12 (2002). 
 18 ‘Big Science’ is a term used by historians of science to refer to large-scale scientific 
projects, which require massive government and industrial investment. World War II 
provided an important impetus for such endeavours as the Manhattan Project. The field of 
biology has featured ‘Big Science’ projects — such as the human genome project. Peter 
Galison and Bruce Hevly, Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research (1992). 
 19 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, opened for signature  
15 April 1994, 1867 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 January 1995), annex 1C (Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) (‘TRIPS Agreement’). 
 20 WTO Doc WT/MIN (01)/DEC/2 (2001). 
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focuses upon the institutional role of international organisations such as the 
World Trade Organization and the WHO. There is a need to ensure that the 
patent system is sufficiently flexible and adaptable to accommodate international 
research efforts on infectious diseases. 
II DUE PREPARATIONS FOR THE PLAGUE: 
THE DILEMMA OF DEFENSIVE PATENTS 
The race to patent the SARS virus highlights the wider trend of public 
institutions increasingly relying upon patents in the field of biotechnology. In the 
US, the Bayh-Dole Act has encouraged universities to patent publicly funded 
research inventions.21 Rebecca Eisenberg and Arti Rai observe:  
The patenting trend accelerated significantly, however, after the passage of the 
Bayh-Dole Act in 1980. By 1997, the total number of patents issued annually to 
universities had increased to 2436. This almost ten-fold increase in university 
patenting was significantly greater than the two-fold increase in overall patenting 
during the same time period, and substantially exceeded growth in university 
research spending.22 
The research institutions involved in SARS research were not only 
encouraged to file patents by this funding environment, but they were also driven 
by the need to preserve public access to the genetic material. 
Three public research organisations — the BCCA, the CDC, and HKU — 
filed patents in respect of the genetic sequence of the SARS virus. The research 
institutions contended that it was necessary to engage in ‘defensive patenting’ to 
protect public access to scientific research. That is, by filing patent applications, 
they intended to pre-empt commercial applicants from obtaining patent rights 
that might hinder further research and development on SARS. Such a tactic is 
common amongst commercial firms. Kimberly Moore comments:  
Defensive patenting often exists in a crowded art to provide the party with a 
repertoire of patents to use defensively as counterclaim weapons. These patents 
are used to strengthen a firm’s negotiating position with competitors (eg, as in 
cross-licensing). These patents may never be asserted affirmatively, but are 
maintained for defensive purposes when the patentee is threatened by competitors 
in a related field. It may be that foreign inventors acquire US patents for these 
defensive and signaling reasons to gain bargaining power in negotiations with 
competitors who threaten litigation.23 
Such a strategy is not unprecedented in public universities or research 
institutions. Most notably, Michael Stratton and Cancer Research UK 
successfully sought a defensive patent in the European Patent Office in respect of 
research associated with the breast cancer-related gene, BRCA2.24 Such a 
measure was designed to prevent rival Myriad Genetics from engaging in the 
exclusive licensing of genetic tests for BRCA2. It is worthwhile evaluating 
                                                 
 21 Arti Rai and Rebecca Eisenberg, ‘Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine’ 
(2003) 66 Law and Contemporary Problems 289, 292. 
 22 Ibid. 
 23 Kimberly Moore, ‘Xenophobia in American Courts’ (2003) 97 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1497, 1533. 
 24 Susan Mayor, ‘Charity Wins BRCA2 Patent’, The Scientist, 13 February 2004 
<http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20040213/02> at 1 October 2004. 
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whether this strategy of ‘defensive patenting’ will be an effective and sustainable 
one in the context of research into the SARS virus. 
Sceptics have pointed out that the term ‘defensive patenting’ has a double 
meaning. They intimate that the phrase is not just used to refer to the filing of 
patent applications in order to promote the greater public good. The term 
‘defensive patenting’ is also employed where applicants acquire patents in order 
to prevent and block others from using them. In such circumstances, the 
motivation is a negative one, to restrict a rival’s freedom to operate. Stuart 
MacDonald observes: ‘A whole vocabulary has developed to describe the role of 
patents in corporate strategy; amidst patent clustering, patent bracketing, patent 
walling and patent blitzkrieg there may be little place for innovation’.25 Such 
sceptics have highlighted the tensions inherent in the term, ‘defensive patenting’, 
between commercial imperatives and the public interest. They contend that 
scientists and university administrators intend to profit from the patents — rather 
than dedicate such inventions to the public domain. It is worth considering 
whether such cynicism is warranted in relation to the conduct of the research 
organisations involved in the SARS research. 
A British Columbia Cancer Agency 
At 4am, 12 April 2003, scientists at the Genome Sciences Centre of the 
BCCA completed the first publicly available draft sequence for a coronavirus 
implicated in SARS.26 The SARS research involved collaboration with a number 
of other institutions — including the National Microbiology Laboratory in 
Winnipeg, the British Columbia Centre for Disease Control and University of 
British Columbia Centre for Disease Control, and the Department of 
Biochemistry and Microbiology at the University of Victoria. 
In the prestigious journal Science, Dr Marco Marra and his various 
collaborators summarised their research into the SARS virus: ‘We sequenced the 
29 751 base genome of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) — 
associated coronavirus known as the Tor2 isolate’.27 In the conclusion, the 
authors stressed the importance of this work from a public health perspective. In 
the short-term, they said, ‘it will allow the rapid development of PCR-based 
assays for this virus that capitalize on novel sequence features, enabling … 
discrimination between this and other circulating coronaviruses’.28 The authors 
predicted: ‘In the longer term, this information will assist in the development of 
antiviral treatments, including neutralizing antibodies and development of a 
vaccine to treat this emerging and deadly disease’.29 
The BCCA filed a provisional patent application in the US claiming the 
complete genetic sequence of the coronavirus. It included details of the virus’ 
                                                 
 25 Stuart Macdonald, ‘Bearing the Burden: Small Firms and the Patent System’ (2003)  
1 Journal of Information Law and Technology [1.9.1] <http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/03-1/ 
macdonald.htm> at 1 October 2004. 
 26 BCCA, ‘Genome Sciences Centre Sequences SARS Associated Corona Virus’  
(Press Release, 12 April 2003) <http://www.bccancer.bc.ca/ABCCA/NewsCentre/2003/ 
GenomeSciencesCentrecrackstheSARSvirusgenome.htm> at 1 October 2004. 
 27 Marco Marra et al, ‘The Genome Sequence of the SARS-Associated Coronavirus’ (2003) 
300 Science 1399, 1399. 
 28 Ibid 1403. 
 29 Ibid. 
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genes, scientific analysis and general description of how the knowledge would be 
converted into diagnostics and treatments. The BCCA retained Smart & Biggar 
Fetherstonhaugh, a Vancouver law firm, to help prepare its case in patent law.30 
The director of the BCCA Technology Development Office, Dr Samuel 
Abraham, was in charge of the patenting of the SARS virus. He applied the 
comprehensive patent and licensing policy of the BCCA.31 The policy has very 
detailed guidelines dealing with collective authorship and collaboration with 
other institutions. The purpose of the policy is ‘to encourage public use and 
commercial application of the research and development carried out at the 
BCCA/BCCF [British Columbia Cancer Foundation] while protecting the rights 
of the inventor(s) and the BCCA/BCCF’.32 It deals with such important matters 
as ownership, collaborative research, the distribution of royalties and the 
disclosure of information. 
Abraham was concerned that commercial firms would seek to patent the 
SARS virus and engage in exclusive licensing — the BCCA had experienced 
difficulties in the past obtaining access to patented genetic tests for breast cancer 
and ovarian cancer. 
The BCCA has previously expressed concern about gene patents — in 
particular, Myriad Genetics’ patents for BRCA1 and BRCA2.33 In 2001, Myriad 
Genetics threatened to sue the British Columbia Government if the Government 
continued to allow genetic testing for BRCA1 and BRCA2 in the BCCA 
laboratories.34 The British Columbia Health Ministry advised the BCCA it could 
no longer pay for the tests. Dr Charmaine Kim-Sing, head of breast cancer 
prevention for the cancer agency, said:  
It’s a huge blow for us. The cost is prohibitive. There isn’t anyone who can come 
up with that kind of money — $3850 is a lot of money for a blood test … Our 
hope is that the government will step in and challenge the patent — they’re the 
only ones who can afford the lawsuit.35 
In 2002, Simon Sutcliffe, the director of BCCA, said 200 of the tests were 
sent to the Ontario Provincial Government, which was willing to carry out 
clinical work in spite of the patent.36 The agency used to do its own tests until 
the British Columbia Government ordered it to stop after legal threats by Myriad 
Genetics. In 2003, the British Columbia Government decided to resume genetic 
testing for women who may be predisposed to breast and ovarian cancer.37 
                                                 
 30 Lyle Stafford, ‘Race on to Realize Value of SARS Patent’, The Toronto Star (Toronto, 
Canada), 17 May 2003, C01. 
 31 BCCA, Patent and Licensing Policy (1994) <http://www.bccancer.bc.ca/NR/rdonlyres/ 
e2n2oftoggyb3lg3eweaf4xvnxybw7citt6aa6t6zgoawadjl6spsyargmbprtw5hbsk3j62yhquaf/ 
BCCAPatentPolicy.pdf> at 1 October 2004. 
 32 Ibid 1. 
 33 Matthew Rimmer, ‘Myriad Genetics: Patent Law and Genetic Testing’ (2003) 25 European 
Intellectual Property Review 20. 
 34 Wendy McLellan, ‘Cost Rules Out Cancer Test for Women in BC’, The Province 
(Vancouver, Canada), 21 September 2001, available at <http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/ 
ip-health/2001-September/001917.html> at 1 October 2004. 
 35 Ibid. 
 36 ‘BC Government Yields to US Company’s Patent on Breast Cancer Gene’, The Canadian 
Press Newsfeed, 21 October 2002.  
 37 Colin Hansen, ‘British Columbia to Resume Testing on Women for Cancer Despite Threat 
of Lawsuit’, CanWest News Service, 16 February 2003. 
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Elsewhere, there has been controversy over patents being enforced in respect 
of the Hepatitis C virus (‘HCV’).38 Scientists from Chiron Corporation in the US 
cloned HCV in 1987 and identified its role in some forms of hepatitis. This was 
the first time that an infectious agent had been identified by molecular cloning 
techniques alone and it was a fundamental breakthrough in research into 
infectious diseases. Chiron Corporation has been granted over 100 patents 
related to HCV in over 20 countries.39 It has successfully defended its broad 
patents against legal challenges and has enforced its patent rights against 
infringing companies. The case of Chiron Corporation and its patents over the 
HCV have attracted wider comment in policy reviews, such as the Nuffield 
Council on Bioethics.40 
In light of such concerns about the exclusive licensing of gene patents, 
Abraham considered a number of options to ensure that there was scientific 
access to the genetic information of the SARS virus. He took the pragmatic 
position that the patent system would consider that the research findings into the 
SARS virus would be considered to be patentable inventions, rather than 
scientific discoveries.41 It was therefore misguided to work on the presumption 
that the genetic research would not be considered to be patentable subject matter. 
Abraham was sceptical of the strategy of open publication without seeking patent 
rights.42 He noted that the single nucleotide polymorphism and express sequence 
tag consortiums had mixed results — companies could still claim patent rights 
after adding value to publicly available information.43  
As a result, Abraham concluded that defensive patenting was the best 
available means of protecting the research into the SARS virus: ‘The filing is to 
ensure that it is available to all, as opposed to making any kind of effort to 
delimit its distribution’.44 Abraham elaborated:  
We’re basically trying to pre-empt the nonsense that has gone on in the past … 
Most research institutions and most scientists have a knee-jerk reaction when they 
hear a patent has been filed. They read it as someone trying to corner the market. 
We’re making sure the market is not cornered.45 
                                                 
 38  Jon Cohen, ‘The Scientific Challenge of Hepatitis C’ (1999) 285 Science 26, 28. 
 39 See, eg, European Patent 0318216.  
 40 Nuffield Council on Bioethics, The Ethics of Patenting DNA: A Discussion Paper (2002) 40–1 
<http://www.nuffieldbioethics.org/fileLibrary/pdf/theethicsofpatentingdna.pdf> at 1 October 2004; 
Murex Diagnostics Australia Pty Ltd v Chiron Corporation and Ortho Diagnostic Systems 
Inc (1995) 55 FCR 194. 
 41 Interview with Dr Samuel Abraham, Director, British Columbia Cancer Agency (Telephone 
interview, 4 November 2003). 
 42 Ibid. 
 43 For a discussion of the SNP consortium, see William Cornish, Margaret Llewelyn and 
Michael Adcock, Intellectual Property Rights and Genetics: A Study into the Impact and 
Management of Intellectual Property Rights within the Healthcare Sector (2003) 
<http://www.phgu.org.uk/about_phgu/intellect_prop_rights.html> at 1 October 2004. 
 44 Antonio Regalado, ‘Scientists’ Hunt for SARS Cure Turns to Competition for Patents’, The 
Wall Street Journal (New York, US), 5 May 2003, A1. 
 45 Peg Brickley, ‘Preemptive SARS Patents: US and Canadian Agencies Say Patents Will 
Preserve Access’, The Scientist, 9 May 2003 <http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/2003 
0509/02> at 1 October 2004. 
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Abraham said the cancer agency has received numerous requests for the 
SARS information since the discovery.46 He reiterated: ‘The reason for doing 
this was basically to enable all and sundry to get access to the various clones and 
material generated from this effort’.47 The BCCA will pursue a strategy of 
non-exclusive licensing if it is granted patent rights to the SARS virus. Abraham 
said: ‘If you try to gouge, nobody will come up to bat. That’s the way the game 
is played’.48 He acknowledged, though, that this policy option was not 
necessarily ideal because there was a great deal of expense involved in filing 
patent applications.49 
Dr Abraham acknowledged, however, that the agency might seek royalties 
and other payments to fund more scientific research within the province:  
The royalties, were there to be any at some later date, would come back to 
basically foster further research here. That would be a goal of any office of our 
type. If the strategy is ill-conceived, we will drop it and there won’t be a patent.50 
Abraham said the initial plan was to ensure that 50 per cent of any money 
goes to the research facility and the remaining 50 per cent to the scientists. This 
division of royalties reflected the position that was stated in the patent and 
licensing policy of the BCCA.51 Abraham doubted whether there would be a 
financial windfall: ‘If you’re hoping to make money off this, you shouldn’t even 
bother getting started. We’re simply doing this to make the research available to 
anyone’.52 He said that others that would share in any potential profits would 
include the British Columbia government, Health Canada and the University of 
Victoria, each of which help fund the BCCA.53 
The leader of the genetic sequencing project, Dr Marco Marra, was 
ambivalent about the patent application in respect of the SARS virus. 
Professionally, he supported the patent application on the pragmatic grounds that 
it protected the freedom to conduct further research in the field: ‘I believe that 
the agency is acting in the best interests of the public in protecting access to the 
sequence information’.54 Personally, Marra had idealistic objections to patents 
being granted at all in respect of genes and gene sequences. He requested that his 
name not be included on the patent application: ‘This stems largely from a 
personal belief that DNA sequence is a discovery as opposed to an invention and 
should not be patentable’.55 Marra said he planned to decline any of the 50 per 
cent of licensing revenues the agency normally allocates to inventors. He 
believed genes should not be subject to patents because they are not true 
inventions and because they are now so easily and quickly deciphered. 
                                                 
 46 ‘BC Cancer Agency Seeks Patent for SARS Gene’, The Canadian Press Newsfeed,  
6 May 2003 <http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20030506/sars_gene 
_patent_030506/?s_name=> at 1 October 2004. 
 47 Ibid.  
 48 Stafford, above n 30. 
 49 Interview with Dr Samuel Abraham, above n 41. 
 50 Meissner, above n 14. 
 51 BCCA, Patent and Licensing Policy, above n 31. 
 52 Stafford, above n 30. 
 53 Ibid. 
 54 Meissner, above n 14. 
 55 Ibid. 
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Some Canadian government organisations took a more enterprising approach 
to the commercial prospects of SARS research. Alan Bernstein, President of the 
Canadian Institutes of Health Research, believed that it would be reasonable if 
the researchers sought patents to obtain private profit and to promote public 
access to information. He said: ‘Patenting per se is not a bad thing. One proper 
reason for patenting is to make sure it’s freely available to everybody’.56 Anie 
Perault, a Vice-President of Genome Canada, which provided funding to set up 
the BCCA genetic laboratory, supported patent applications being filed in respect 
of the SARS research: ‘Overall we think researchers should protect their 
intellectual property. We do favour commercialization but we don’t have a 
position on how far it should go’.57 Stephen Owen, the Secretary of State for 
Western Economic Diversification, heralded the scientific work of the BCCA as 
a commercial boon. He told the Canadian Parliament that there were 
opportunities to develop both genetic tests and vaccines for the SARS virus: 
‘This is a potential commercial follow-through from a great innovative 
breakthrough in mapping the SARS virus’.58 
B US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
The CDC was also engaged in research in the SARS virus. A team of 10 
scientists, supported by technicians, took 12 days to grow cells taken from a 
throat culture taken from one of the SARS patients in Vero cells in order to 
reproduce the ribonucleic acid (‘RNA’) of the disease-causing coronavirus. The 
CDC announced on 14 April 2003 that it had sequenced the genome for the 
coronavirus believed to be responsible for the global SARS epidemic.59 The 
CDC discussed the relationship of this research to their Canadian counterparts: 
The CDC sequence is nearly identical to that determined by a Canadian laboratory 
late last week. The significant difference is that the CDC-determined sequence 
has 15 additional nucleotides, which provides the important beginning of the 
sequence, CDC scientists said ...  
The new sequence has 29 727 nucleotides, which places it well within the typical 
RNA boundaries for coronaviruses. The CDC sequence was nearly identical to 
that determined by the BCCA ... 
The nearly identical findings in the US and Canada are important because they 
were derived from different individuals who were infected in different countries. 
This suggests that the virus probably originated from a common source.60  
Strikingly, the CDC suggests that there are subtle but significant differences 
between their research and the findings of the BCCA. 61 It remains unclear what, 
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if any, bearing the discovery of the additional nucleotides will have upon the 
evaluation of any patent claims made in respect of the SARS virus. 
Paul Rota of the CDC and his collaborators published the research in a May 
edition of Science.62 In sequencing the genome, CDC scientists collaborated with 
coronavirus experts at academic institutions and research institutions. The CDC 
worked with researchers from the Departments of Biochemistry and Biophysics 
at the University of California–San Francisco, the Department of Virology at 
Erasmus University in the Netherlands, and the Department of Virology at the 
Bernhard Nocht Institute for Tropical Medicine in Germany. Dr William Bellini, 
SARS laboratory team coordinator, praised such international teamwork: ‘This is 
an active, working community of scientific experts who have been contributing 
their knowledge and expertise throughout this investigation’.63 Dr Julie 
Gerberding, CDC Director, stressed the significance of the sequencing of the 
genome: ‘Research laboratories can use this information to begin to target 
antiviral drugs, to form the basis for developing vaccines, and to develop 
diagnostic tests that can lead to early detection’.64 
The CDC was guided by its policy statement on ‘Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreements and Intellectual Property Licensing’, which 
emphasises: ‘For the CDC investigator, this agency mission prescribes the 
exploration of ideas, the communication of ideas and information to colleagues, 
and a responsibility for the prompt and accurate publication of findings’.65 Under 
this policy, research results are disseminated freely through publication in the 
scientific literature and presentations at public fora. The policy acknowledges: 
‘Brief delays in this dissemination of research results may be permitted under a 
[Cooperative Research and Development Agreement] as necessary in order to 
file corresponding patent or other intellectual property applications’.66 
Following this policy, the CDC has submitted a patent application on the 
SARS virus and its entire genetic content. Rather than trying to profit if such a 
patent were awarded, the CDC, like the BCCA, says its application is to prevent 
others from monopolising the field. Dr Julie Gerberding said: 
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Our highest priority in all of this was to get information about SARS and the 
SARS genome and the SARS coronavirus into the public domain as quickly as we 
possibly can.  
That’s why we published the genome on the Web site. The concern that the 
federal government is looking at right now is that we could be locked out of this 
opportunity to work with this virus if it’s patented by someone else, and so by 
initiating steps to secure patent rights, we assure that we will be able to continue 
to make the virus and the products from the virus available in the public domain, 
and that we can continue to promote the rapid technological transfer of this 
biomedical information into tools and products that are useful to patients. 
So from our standpoint, it’s a protective measure to make sure that the access to 
the virus remains open for everyone.67 
CDC spokesman Llewellyn Grant reiterated: ‘The whole purpose of the patent 
is to prevent folks from controlling the technology. This is being done to give the 
industry and other researchers reasonable access to the samples’.68 
The CDC was conscious of competition to patent the SARS virus. Director of 
the Technology Transfer Office at the CDC, Andrew Watkins, commented: ‘We 
made a decision early on to seek whatever patent protection we could get as a 
defensive measure, but not to delay publication of findings’.69 He observed that 
the CDC’s application does not purport to cover vaccines, diagnostic tests or 
other technology related to SARS.70  
Watkins said that the Canadian research seemed to be moving on the same 
course as the US group.71 He predicted that the most likely outcome for the 
Canadian and US applications was a negotiated joint ownership that could 
include hundreds of ‘inventors’ from different countries. However, Watkins 
noted that the research undertaken by HKU was dissimilar: ‘To the extent there 
might be a competition, I don’t think our goals are the same’.72 Watkins noted 
that the USPTO could have to determine patent priority and ownership between 
the various parties: 
If we’re all trying to claim the same invention, including Hong Kong, then there 
would be an interference procedure in which the patent office would determine 
who was the first to invent. It could be we’ll wind up with a jointly owned single 
patent, and we have not done that analysis yet.73 
Watkins acknowledged that the work undertaken by the CDC involved a 
collaboration between a number of researchers and institutions: ‘Even if the 
CDC’s application wins, the ultimate inventor list will be much longer than the 
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CDC’.74 However, it should be recognised that priority is only awarded to the 
first to invent in the jurisdiction of the US. Everywhere else in the world, priority 
would be awarded to the first to file the patent application. 
C The University of Hong Kong and Versitech Ltd 
At the same time as the teams in North America were engaging in genetic 
research on the SARS virus, Professor Malik Peiris of HKU and his collaborators 
identified the coronavirus as a possible cause of SARS.75 The researchers 
reported that ‘a virus belonging to the family Coronaviridae was isolated from 
the lung biopsy and nasopharyngeal aspirate of two SARS patients and other 
patients with SARS had a serological response to this virus’.76 Peiris said that 
after his team discovered the virus, it sent samples to other scientists but no 
patent was immediately sought. He maintained that the Hong Kong team only 
sought a patent after it became apparent that others were seeking them too.77 
Dr Frederick Leung conceded that the Canadian and US research 
organisations uploaded sequences onto the National Center for Biotechnology 
Information first. However, he maintained that five days after his team had 
uploaded their sequences, their rival’s flaws began to emerge:  
They had to issue corrections and filled in the deficient sequences on later days 
whereas we were right from the start. It is disappointing because I do believe we 
deserve the recognition of being first. 
This is critical in science, not least because we had the most accurate reporting yet 
Science took our rival’s paper because they said they were first.78 
Leung was proud of the effort of HKU, given its relative size: ‘There were 10 of 
us whereas the Canadian group would have had 50–60 people and the US team 
have over 300 working for them’.79 
HKU’s intellectual property and technology transfer unit, Versitech Ltd, filed 
for patents over the SARS virus with the USPTO.80 Hailson Yu, deputy 
managing director of Versitech Ltd, said: ‘It’s very competitive, but we think we 
are the early bird’.81 He commented that a patent application was filed to ensure 
that academic institutions would not be blocked from studying the virus. He 
emphasised the need for freedom to operate in this field: ‘If we didn’t patent, for 
example, if there is a third party, they file a similar patent, and then eventually if 
we have to pay a license fee to do the research and the work on that subject 
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matter, I don’t think it is reasonable and logical’.82 Yu said that the University 
would charge modest license fees to corporations who want to manufacture 
products. He added that the University was negotiating agreements with 
commercial partners for a diagnostic test. Yu anticipated that there would be 
significant discounts for academic researchers: ‘We can license it for $1 or one 
penny, you know, to grant the right for them to do the research’.83 
A South China Morning Post correspondent, Jake van der Kamp, demanded 
that HKU clarify its intentions with regard to its SARS research.84 He asked the 
pointed question: ‘Does the University of Hong Kong seek to make money from 
its research work on SARS or will it give the world the benefit of that work for 
free?’85 The correspondent observed:  
What we need here is a statement from HKU that any SARS patent it may win 
will be made available to others for no cost. It is all very well that it should use 
such a patent to demand formal recognition of its work but this is as far as it 
should go.86 
The correspondent concluded that ‘it would strike a jarring note nonetheless if 
the cost of any medication that might result from the HKU research were to be 
higher because it has to be paid patent fees’.87  
North American commentators also voiced suspicions about the patents 
sought by HKU. An article by Richard Gold from McGill University in The 
Lancet inspired a curt response from Professor Lap-Chee Tsui, the  
Vice-Chancellor of HKU.88 Tsui has very personal experience of some of the 
issues related to patent law and genetics from his involvement in the race to 
discover the location of cystic fibrosis.89 In 1989, he received international 
acclaim when he identified along with Francis Collins the defective gene that 
causes cystic fibrosis, which was a major breakthrough in human genetics. Tsui 
was Geneticist-in-Chief and Head of the Genetics and Genomic Biology 
Program of the Research Institute, at the Hospital for Sick Children in Toronto. 
He was the President of the Human Genome Organisation in 1999 and 2000. 
During that time, the organisation released a number of policy papers on gene 
patenting and benefit-sharing.90 
Tsui was puzzled as to why Gold had singled out HKU in his defence of the 
CDC and the BCCA. Specifically, the commentary by Gold argued that the 
patent option would provide the two institutions ‘with more leverage in dealing 
with [HKU’s] Versitech’.91 Gold further argued that CDC and BCCA would ‘use  
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the patent system to serve the public good’.92 Tsui responded:  
I wish to make clear that HKU is a research-led institution, committed to the 
public cause of higher education and benefiting society. Versitech is a technology 
transfer company, established in accordance with good practices of international 
universities to handle HKU’s intellectual properties. Neither HKU nor Versitech 
are profit-seeking organisations, and they both hold the same view as CDC and 
BCCA — namely, to serve the public. HKU is committed to sharing its research 
results with society; locally, regionally, and internationally. We will continue to 
build up our research strength, but we cannot hope to share the benefits of our 
newly found knowledge if we do not properly manage our intellectual property 
rights.93 
Tsui obviously resented the suspicions that were being aired about the patents 
sought by HKU and Versitech. He thought that it was a self-evident truth that the 
research organisation was engaged in ‘defensive patenting’ for the public good.94 
D Summary 
Public research institutions in Canada, the US and Hong Kong have filed 
patent applications on the genetic information of the SARS virus. These 
organisations have argued that it has been necessary to file patents in order to 
protect public access to the scientific information and research. There is no 
reason to doubt the sincerity of the motivations of the research institutions. 
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile acknowledging the limitations of the strategy of 
‘defensive patenting’. Richard Gold from McGill University comments:  
One could argue that the CDC’s and BCCA’s use of the patents actually 
demonstrates that the patent system is working well. What this argument ignores 
is that, as genomic patents increase in number, it will become prohibitively 
expensive for public organisations to afford not only the expense of patenting 
genomes and DNA sequences, but also the significant costs of entering into 
licences and administering those licences. Expecting non-profit organisations to 
obtain patents on all their genomic inventions is not a sustainable solution to 
maintaining an open and free public domain.95 
However, there have also been concerns expressed that the public research 
institutions will seek to commercialise any patents granted on the SARS virus. It 
remains to be seen whether the public research organisations will collaborate 
with commercial companies in order to develop diagnostic tests, vaccines and 
pharmaceutical drugs. 
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A number of commercial companies have been interested in developing 
genetic tests, diagnostics, and vaccines for the SARS virus.96 A number of 
provisional patents have been filed in respect of commercial products relating to 
the SARS virus. However, the commercial value of such research and 
accompanying patents remains uncertain. As one commentator notes:  
If efforts to contain the germ prove unsuccessful or if it re-emerges seasonally 
much like flu, the market for tests and treatments ultimately could be huge. But if 
the impact of the virus wanes after the current outbreak, companies will have little 
incentive to pursue the market.97 
Peter Pekos, Chief Executive Officer of Dalton Chemical Laboratories Inc, 
predicted that the pursuit by medical researchers to profit from studying the 
illness is likely to be both sluggish and expensive: ‘It’s a gamble and there’s a 
long time between the patent filing and the potential commercial payoff. It’s not 
for the faint of heart. Most of the time, you’re lucky if you can offset your patent 
costs’.98 Similarly, Boston patent attorney Thomas Saunders, observed: ‘This is 
no more than an opportunity to buy lottery tickets’.99 It will take at least a few 
years for the patents filed by commercial companies on diagnostics, vaccines and 
pharmaceutical drugs to be issued. 
In response to such commercial ventures, Ohio Democrat Congressman 
Dennis Kucinich expressed his concerns about the race to patent the SARS virus:  
Any eventual vaccine or cure for SARS should also remain in the public domain 
so access to affordable treatment is possible in the event of a public health 
emergency. If the patent were held in private hands, it could prevent cooperative 
efforts among scientists across the globe and complicate efforts to make 
treatments or vaccines available to the public at large.100 
Kucinich proposed the introduction of legislation ‘that would create a new 
network of government labs for the research, development and manufacture of 
pharmaceutical products and biologics’.101 He envisioned that the government 
laboratories would perform both research and development for new therapies and 
cures, and form cooperative agreements with educational, research and private 
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institutions. Kucinich observed that the US Congress should not be beholden to 
the commercial desires of large pharmaceutical companies: ‘Now faced with 
global public-health threats like SARS, we must stop foolishly pandering to the 
pharmaceutical industry and demand balance’.102 He supported the use of an 
open source system to facilitate access to scientific information and improve 
research and development: ‘This will allow us to tap the collective genius of the 
world community of scientists’.103 
III DISCOVERIES OF NATURE: GENE PATENTS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 
An editorial in the journal Nature discussed the race to patent the SARS virus 
in the context of ‘Gene Patents and the Public Good’.104 The opinion piece 
commented: ‘A race to claim patents on the SARS virus raises questions about 
the patent system’s ability to cope with genomics’.105 The editorial elaborated:  
CDC director Julie Gerberding told reporters last week that, in private hands, a 
patent on the viral sequence might delay the development and refinement of tests 
and treatments for the contagious pneumonia that has already killed several 
hundred people. Gerberding’s admission gives tacit acknowledgement to a 
growing concern among biomedical researchers that broad patents on genetic 
sequences may, in some cases, have a stifling effect on research and negative 
consequences for public health.106 
In the past, there have been similar competitions in respect of genetic 
research. Notable examples of such rivalry include the isolation of human insulin 
and growth hormone,107 the discovery of the familial genes for breast and 
ovarian cancers,108 and characterisation of the structure of DNA.109 There have 
been concerns that patents held by private companies could inhibit research, 
particularly with respect to the development of clinical applications such as 
genetic tests. Furthermore, governments have been worried that the patent 
system could undermine the delivery of health care. 
The patents filed in respect of the SARS virus have rekindled debate over the 
patenting of genes and other life forms. As the editorial in Nature opines:  
There are no clear-cut answers. But when pre-emptive patenting is necessary to 
ensure that rapid solutions are found to an important health problem, something 
seems to be out of balance. Policy-makers should investigate what checks and 
balances are necessary to ensure that the patent system continues to do its job of 
stimulating innovation for the public good.110 
There have been a number of policy reports dealing with these concerns 
regarding gene patents and human health. In 2002, US Representative Lynn 
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Rivers sponsored a Bill in Congress that would have allowed health care entities 
to perform genetic diagnostic tests without fear of patent-infringement 
lawsuits.111 In the UK, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics recommended that in 
future, patents on genetic sequences should be the exception rather than the 
rule.112 In Canada, a report issued by Ontario’s Provincial Government, 
following its experience with BRCA1 and BRCA2, explored solutions such as a 
compulsory licensing scheme in which a public entity would determine who 
should have access to which gene patents, and even set licensing fees.113 The 
Canadian Biotechnology Advisory Committee has investigated broader issues 
associated with the patenting of higher life forms and human biological 
material.114 The Australian Law Reform Commission has also considered policy 
options with respect to gene patents and human health.115 
There is a need to reform the patent system to address the global nature of 
scientific inquiry, the unique nature of genetic science, and the increasing pace of 
technological change. There is a need to reconsider the patent criteria of the 
scope of patentable subject matter, novelty and inventive step, utility, and secret 
use. First, there has been much debate about the expansion of patentable subject 
matter to include biotechnological inventions. Second, there have been 
international tensions over the priority of inventions: the US patent regime 
favours the first to invent, whereas other jurisdictions award priority to the first 
to file a patent application. There is a need to raise the threshold for novelty and 
inventive step — in line with the recommendations of the Federal Trade 
Commission. Fourth, the USPTO issued new examination guidelines on the 
requirement of utility. It is contended that there needs to be a further tightening 
of the requirement of utility. Finally, the collaboration between multiple 
institutions poses problems in terms of prior art and secret use. The legislative 
reforms proposed by the Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement 
(CREATE) Act (‘CREATE Act’)116 seek to remedy some of the problems that 
arise in respect of such collaborative ventures. There is a need for further 
international harmonisation in terms of patent law and practice. 
A Patentable Subject Matter 
The debate over the race to patent the SARS virus took place against a 
background of wider discussions over the impact of gene patents on health care. 
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Since a pivotal US Supreme Court ruling in 1980, the USPTO has awarded 
patents for living things, most notably individual human genes.117 Peter Yu 
considers moves to patent the SARS virus in light of the debate over gene 
patents:  
Since Chakrabarty, patents have been granted on a wide variety of bio-engineered 
products, including polyploid Pacific oysters and the famous Harvard mouse. The 
US biotechnology industry has flourished, and the US has become a world leader 
in genetic research. Today, naturally occurring life forms remain ineligible for 
patent protection (since they are not inventions ‘made by the hand of man’). 
However, one could arguably patent any gene or life form that has been modified 
by biotechnology, including genetic engineering.118 
The US jurisprudence on gene patents has been influential on a number of 
other jurisdictions. Graham Dutfield comments: ‘It is surely not coincidental that 
the USA pioneered both the commercialization of biotechnology applications 
and the development of patent law to protect them’.119  
Biotechnology companies and pharmaceutical drug manufacturers argued that 
the aim of allowing patents on genes and organisms was to encourage the 
commercial development of useful inventions.120 For instance, Franz Humer, the 
CEO of F Hoffmann-La Roche AG, maintained that patent protection is essential 
in the fight against diseases:  
Our role is to find new drugs, and intellectual property rights is a framework in 
which innovation and competition can thrive. Patents are essential to guarantee 
continued high-risk investment in R&D. SARS is the latest reminder that new 
threats can emerge at any time. Therefore, we must maintain continuous capacity 
for mounting a brisk and effective response. This responsibility lies with the 
pharmaceutical industry; without patent protection, there is no research.121 
However, there has been some doubt whether commercial incentives have 
been necessary to foster investment in SARS vaccines and diagnostics. Dr 
Dianne Nicol, of the Centre for Law and Genetics at the University of Tasmania, 
argued that the public health need for SARS-related tests, medicines and 
vaccines was so great that the need for incentives in this case seemed 
‘questionable’.122 
Reformers have argued that the race to patent the SARS virus reveals the need 
to ameliorate the patent system. Richard Gold argues that there is a need for 
governments to address ‘an emerging crisis of confidence in the patent 
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system’.123 He goes on to recommend a number of generic reforms to the patent 
system:  
The drafting of licensing guidelines to ensure access to genomic developments, 
introducing compulsory licensing provisions, better defining the experimental use 
exception in countries without a clear exception (eg, the USA and Canada), and 
introducing a morality clause linked to the manner in which genomic and genetic 
inventions are commercialised. It is unlikely that that any one option will work 
alone. For example, industry will probably only follow licensing guidelines if 
governments make it clear that they are prepared to grant compulsory licences if 
these guidelines are not implemented.124 
Gold suggests that the debate over the SARS virus highlights the need for the 
reform: ‘The patent system needs to be adjusted — not discarded — by 
governments to better reach the goal of that system: the attainment of the public 
good’.125  
By contrast, idealists have expressed per se objections to the patenting of the 
SARS virus. Some commentators maintain that patents should not be granted in 
respect of natural products. A long-time opponent of the patenting of 
biotechnological inventions, Jeremy Rifkin, argued in respect of SARS:  
These are discoveries of nature and it’s baloney that we allow patents on living 
things. We didn’t allow chemists to patent the periodic table — there’s no patent 
on hydrogen and I don’t see why they can patent discoveries of nature.126 
Many scientists argue that patents should not be issued for genes on the 
grounds that genes are scientific discoveries, not inventions.127 For instance, 
Marco Marra of the BCCA believed that the SARS virus should not be the 
subject of a patent because it was a scientific discovery: ‘This stems largely from 
a personal belief that DNA sequence is a discovery as opposed to an invention 
and should not be patentable’.128  
Other critics argue that intellectual property rights and life forms are 
incompatible.129 For instance, the novelist Margaret Atwood raised concerns 
about the commodification of life. Her latest book, Oryx And Crake, is a satire 
about the corruption of science by commerce.130 Atwood was alarmed by the 
patents filed on the SARS virus:  
A really good example of why you shouldn’t commercialize everything is the 
SARS epidemic. If public health were something that had to be paid for by an 
individual, the thing would be all over the place by now. Our world is not made of 
watertight compartments. Choices will come along soon. We hope that we will 
make the informed ones. We hope that we will not commercialize bloody 
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everything. We hope that there will be watchdogs in place to keep things from 
getting out of hand.131 
The USPTO is unconvinced by such per se objections to the patenting of life 
forms. It insists that ‘anything under the sun made by man’ is patentable subject 
matter — including, presumably, the SARS virus.132 However, arguments that 
patents should not be granted on higher life forms may receive a more 
sympathetic hearing in Canada.133 
B Novelty and Inventive Step 
Given that the three public research institutions — the BCCA, the CDC and 
Versitech — all filed patent applications in the USPTO, it is worthwhile 
considering US patent law and practice in some further detail. 
Unlike most other jurisdictions, the USPTO awards patents to the first to 
invent, not the first to file an application for a patent. Peter Yu comments that it 
will be difficult to resolve complex disputes over priority in respect of treatments 
of the SARS virus.134 He observes:  
Although the patent race is heated, there likely will not be a clear winner — or 
there might be many winners. There are several reasons. 
Under US law, a patent can be granted on a specific part of the SARS virus or on 
‘improvements’ of what has already been discovered. Because the virus mutates 
from one form to another, the patent applicant might claim rights in only a 
specific mutation of the virus, rather than its original form or its other variants. 
While the US system awards patents to those who are the first to invent, the 
European system awards patents to those who are the first to file the application. 
Because of these differences, the US and European patent holders theoretically 
could be different.135 
It will be difficult to determine the priority of the patent applications in the 
complex set of international collaborations. The situation is further complicated 
by a lack of harmonisation of rules governing novelty and inventive step. 
In matters where two or more inventors submit patent applications claiming 
the same invention, the USPTO engages in ‘interference’ proceedings to 
determine the first to invent.136 In an empirical study of this unique system, Jon 
Merz and Michelle Henry found that interference proceedings in gene discovery 
and biotechnology are much more prevalent than in other areas of technology.137 
They consider a number of notable races for genetic discovery, and conclude:  
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The high level of competition in these cases suggests several things about the 
nature of the research. First, without taking any credit away from the scientists so 
engaged, gene discovery has become ordinary. Many share necessary intellectual 
know-how, and success is predicated upon the ability and luck in identifying, 
soliciting and studying the ‘right’ families and groups. Second, as in other 
scientific fields, these discoveries build upon knowledge contributed by others, 
reflecting the co-dependent, but competitive, environment of science.138 
In further research, Mark Lemley and Colleen Chien comment: ‘In over 40 
per cent of the cases, the first to invent is last to file’.139 Furthermore, ‘a large 
number of priority disputes involve near-simultaneous invention; and that the 
vast majority of such disputes could be resolved without reliance on much of the 
evidence that the law permits’.140 Such evidence raises questions whether this 
unique system is worth retaining as a means of determining priority. 
To obtain patents over the SARS virus, the various applicants will have to 
demonstrate that their invention is ‘novel’ and distinguishable from the ‘prior 
art’ — materials and inventions that exist before the patent application. It will be 
difficult for the parties to sift through the prior art with respect to coronaviruses, 
and demonstrate that the invention is novel and inventive. An elementary search 
revealed that 618 patents filed in the USPTO mentioned the keyword 
‘coronavirus’.141 Of those, 89 patents mentioned ‘coronavirus’ in the claims. 
Singapore patent attorney Aaradhana Sadasivam comments:  
A wealth of published and granted patent applications are available on corona 
viruses — the close relative of the SARS virus, and of course vaccines, 
techniques, and methods of protection against it. Several patents have already 
been published and granted by major jurisdictions such as the USPTO, EPO and 
the International Bureau. Some examples include an application for a Canine 
coronavirus S gene and Uses Thereof (US6057436), Anti-Coronavirus vaccine 
(WO03013599), Methods for Producing Recombinant Coronavirus 
(WO02086068) and Canine Coronavirus Vaccines (IE881689L).142 
Therefore it is necessary for patent applicants to engage in a thorough 
mapping of the existing field of patents and other prior art. A medical or 
scientific research effort would presumably need to analyse the pre-existing body 
of scientific data, tests and results in the same area of research. The use of such 
patented data would require the necessary consents and licences to be sought and 
obtained before using them legitimately for the purpose of commercialisation. 
Some enterprising souls have sought to provide commercial assistance in 
charting the prior art. Ella Cheong, Miranda and Sprusons have been advertising 
a SARS Patent Mapping Report for the princely sum of US$2950 (discounted 
from US$5800).143 The authors vaunt the report:  
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The SARS Patent and Analysis Report presented a detailed analysis of the patent 
maps of virus and specifically coronavirus related technologies. There is a rich 
corpus of patent documents pertaining to molecular biology, and nearly 4000 are 
virus related to viral diagnostics and therapeutics.144 
However, the Report merely provides a map of existing patents related to 
viruses. It does not yield any new insights into the patenting practices of research 
institutions and commercial companies in relation to the SARS virus. 
In its report, To Promote Innovation, the Federal Trade Commission provides 
a number of creative reform proposals with respect to novelty and inventive step 
in the US.145 It recommends that Congress tighten legal standards to determine 
whether an invention is ‘obvious’:  
It is important to protect against the issuance of obvious patents that may confer 
market power and unjustifiably raise costs. Requiring concrete suggestions 
beyond those actually needed by a person with ordinary skill in the art, and failing 
to give weight to suggestions implicit from the art as a whole and from the nature 
of the problem to be solved, is likely to result in patents on obvious inventions 
and is likely to be unnecessarily detrimental to competition. The Federal Circuit’s 
most recent articulations of the suggestion test seem to signal greater appreciation 
of these issues and would better facilitate implementation of the test in ways 
sensitive to competitive concerns.146 
The Federal Trade Commission urges that in assessing obviousness, the 
analysis should ascribe to the person having ordinary skill in the art an ability to 
combine or modify prior art references that are consistent with the creativity and 
problem-solving skills that in fact are characteristic of those having ordinary skill 
in the art. It argues that failing to give weight to suggestions implicit from the 
prior art as a whole, suggestions from the nature of the problem to be solved, and 
the ability and knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art, errs on the side of 
issuing patents on obvious inventions and is likely to be unnecessarily 
detrimental to competition. 
There are other mechanisms available to resolve the disputes over priority. Dr 
Samuel Abraham of the BCCA has suggested that patent pooling might be one 
possible solution to resolve the competing claims for patents in respect of the 
SARS virus.147  
Members of the USPTO have published a paper on whether patent pools are a 
solution to the problem of access in respect of biotechnology patents.148 They 
define a ‘patent pool’ as an ‘agreement between two or more patent owners to 
license one or more of their patents to one another or third parties’.149 
Alternatively, a patent pool may also be defined as ‘the aggregation of 
intellectual property rights which are the subject of cross-licensing, whether they 
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are transferred directly by patentee to licensee or through some medium, such as 
a joint venture, set up specifically to administer the patent pool’.150 The USPTO 
paper is optimistic about the use of patent pools to solve access problems: ‘The 
use of patent pools in the biotechnology field could serve the interests of both the 
public and private industry, a win-win situation’.151  
Such proposals have been met with mixed responses. David Resnik is a 
champion of such a scheme: ‘Industry leaders and scientists could choose the 
path of enlightened self-interest by forming a biotechnology patent pool’.152 
However, Lori Andrews raises serious concerns about whether patent pools are 
particularly well adapted to gene patents: ‘Gene patent holders may be less likely 
to participate in voluntary patent pools than are patent holders from other 
industries’.153 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
has echoed such complaints:  
It is true that there is a growing interdependence among patents, that the claims of 
many patents are narrower, and that patents are held by multiple owners. 
Licensing transaction costs are burdensome and freedom of operation is restricted, 
thus increasing the potential for conflict among researchers. However, the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry may be fundamentally different from the 
electronics sector. It is not an industry in which defining standards is important, 
and assuring interoperability of technologies is not very important, especially not 
in the development of therapeutics. A company’s worth is tightly tied to its 
intellectual property and fosters a ‘bunker mentality’.154 
Furthermore, there is ongoing debate about whether patent pools have 
anti-competitive effects in the marketplace. It has been noted that patent pools 
could in some circumstances encourage collusion and price fixing, and raise the 
costs of technologies.155 
C Utility 
In the debate over the race to patent the SARS virus, John Doll, the director of 
biotechnology for the USPTO, affirmed that a patent would need to satisfy the 
requirement of utility: ‘It must have a real world utility and there has to be the 
hand of man involved. You can’t just turn over a rock and scrape something off 
the bottom of it and apply for a patent’.156 
In the US, the courts have sought to define the requirement of utility under 
patent law. In Brenner v Manson, the US Supreme Court took a restrictive view 
of utility.157 It held that a chemical product with no known use, or useful for 
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merely further research, was not a patentable invention. Justice Fortas 
emphasised the importance of the requirement of utility in patent law: ‘The basic 
quid pro quo contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a 
patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an invention with 
substantial utility’.158 Emphasising that ‘a patent is not a hunting license’, his 
Honour concluded: ‘It is not a reward for the search, but compensation for its 
successful conclusion’.159 
In 2001, the USPTO issued revised examination guidelines explaining how 
the utility requirement should be applied by patent examiners.160 The guidelines 
required patent applicants to explicitly identify, unless already well established, a 
specific, substantial and credible utility for all inventions. In effect, it raised the 
bar to ensure that patent applicants demonstrate a ‘real world’ utility. Todd 
Dickinson explained the administrative reforms to Congress.161 He observed: 
‘An asserted utility is credible unless the logic underlying the assertion is 
seriously flawed, or the facts upon which the assertion is based are inconsistent 
with the logic underlying the assertion’.162 Dickinson noted: ‘A utility is specific 
when it is particular to the subject matter claimed’.163 Finally, he observed: ‘A 
substantial utility is one that defines a “real world” use’.164 
There has been much discussion about the new USPTO examination 
guidelines for the requirement of utility.165 The Nuffield Council on Bioethics 
has argued that the USPTO has set the requirement of utility too low:  
While we welcome the new USPTO guidelines, we take the view that where 
‘credibility’ means no more than ‘theoretical possibility’ (ie where something is 
credible simply where it is not incredible) the threshold for utility is still set too 
low. The current state of genetics and biochemistry does not make it difficult to 
suggest functions for DNA sequences that are ‘theoretically possible’, in the sense 
that they are not ruled out by what is already known; but this should not suffice 
for the award of a patent. Instead, what is required is some evidence that the DNA 
sequence actually has the claimed ‘specific’ utility and that the claimed utility is 
truly ‘substantial’.166 
The Council recommended that the USPTO should monitor the impact of the 
Guidelines on the examination of patents to ensure that the criterion for utility 
was rigorously applied so that the grant of a patent more properly reflects the 
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inventor’s contribution. If this proves not to be the case, the Guidelines should be 
reviewed and strengthened to achieve this purpose as soon as is practicable.167 
Against this background, the USPTO will have to determine whether the 
patents filed in respect of the genetic sequence of the SARS virus have a 
specific, substantial and credible utility. The examiners will also have to be 
mindful of the requirement of utility in dealing with downstream inventions — 
such as genetic tests, vaccines and pharmaceutical drugs. In particular, care must 
be taken to ensure that patents are not granted to spurious cures for the SARS 
virus.168 There is a need for examiners to subject patent applications to close 
scrutiny. 
D Secret Use and the Grace Period 
Some commentators have speculated that the sharing of information about 
SARS research among the network of research institutions could affect the 
validity of at least some of the applications and the entitlement to some patent 
rights.169 There have been doubts as to whether a grace period is an effective 
means of dealing with such issues.170 
In the wake of the quest for the sequence of the SARS virus, Representative 
Lamar Smith of the 21st District of Texas put forward the CREATE Act.171 
Smith is the Chairman of the influential Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Property. Representative Smith argued that the patent system 
should be amended to recognise the collaborative nature of research across 
multiple institutions. He cited the case of SARS research as a primary example 
of collaborative research that takes place across public and private institutions:  
Congress should act to promote innovation and communication among 
researchers, and streamline patent application approval. The success scientists 
achieved in rapidly identifying the cause of severe acute respiratory syndrome 
(SARS) is a recent example of how collaboration among government and private 
labs can save lives and protect the public. The reaction to the SARS virus 
demonstrates that in an increasingly connected world, it is necessary for our 
public and private organizations to adapt to new challenges and develop new 
ways of doing business.172 
Understanding the need to facilitate collaboration within institutions, 
Congress had earlier enacted a series of amendments to patent law in 1984, with 
the Patent Law Amendments Act.173 Section 103(c) created a ‘safe harbor’ for 
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inventions that were the product of a collaboration involving co-inventors within 
a single company.174 In OddzOn Products Inc v Just Toys Inc, the US Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit narrowly interpreted § 103(c) of Title 35, 
USC.175 Somewhat apologetically, the Court of Appeals held that the 
amendment allowed for the disclosure of information among collaborators within 
the same organisation, but did not extend to the sharing of information within 
multiple institutions:  
It is historically very clear that this provision was intended to avoid the 
invalidation of patents under § 103 on the basis of the work of fellow employees 
engaged in team research. There was no clearly apparent purpose in Congress’s 
inclusion of § 102(f) in the amendment other than an attempt to ameliorate the 
problems of patenting the results of team research.176 
The decision created a threat that a patent could be invalidated in the 
circumstances of a collaborative research effort involving multiple organisations. 
The CREATE Act sought to expand the secret prior art exception to 
collaborators involving ‘team researchers’ located at multiple organisations. The 
amendments dealt with the limitation on non-public information in obviousness 
determinations. Section 2 proposed amending § 103(c) of Title 35, USC to 
ensure that prior art should not preclude patentability where the subject matter 
and the claimed invention were owned by the same person or subject to an 
obligation of assignment to the same person. It defined the term ‘joint research 
agreement’ as meaning ‘a written contract, grant, or cooperative agreement 
entered into by two or more persons or entities for the performance of 
experimental, developmental, or research work in the field of the claimed 
invention’. Under § 3, the amendments shall apply to any patent granted on, or 
after the date of the Act’s enactment. The amendments made by this Act would 
not affect any final decision of a court or the USPTO that was rendered before 
the date of enactment, nor affect the right of any party in any action pending 
before the USPTO or a court. It is uncertain whether such legislation, if enacted, 
would apply to the collaborators in the SARS research network. Much will 
depend upon the dates at which patents dealing with the SARS virus are granted. 
The House of Representatives Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and 
Intellectual Property conducted an oversight hearing on the topic.177 A number 
of witnesses gave evidence relating to the intersection of patent law, cooperative 
research, technology transfer and biotechnology issues. Jon Soderstrom, the head 
of the Office of Cooperative Research at Yale University, observed:  
The evolution of science has made interdisciplinary research more and more 
common and, in fact, essential if solutions to complex problems are to be found. 
The recent stunning example of SARS is but one of many.178 
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The Senate approved the CREATE Act on 25 June 2004. Senator Orrin Hatch 
commented: ‘This act will encourage greater cooperation among universities, 
public research institutions and the private sector’.179 It remains uncertain 
whether the legislation will be passed because of the Presidential election.  
E Summary 
The international research into the SARS virus is characteristic of ‘Big 
Science’ projects, which have become a feature of modern genomics. Such 
enterprises are characterised by international collaborations between a range of 
institutions and multiple authors.180 The patent system is ill-adapted to deal with 
global research initiatives, which involve multiple researchers and institutions 
across a number of countries. In an article entitled ‘An International Patent 
Utopia?’, Paul Edward Geller comments:  
The old patent regime has fallen out of step with technological progress. Mankind 
started with trial-and-error tinkering and shifted to cumulative experimentation. In 
modern times, applied science has helped to industrialise research and 
development. Paradoxically, as this progress has accelerated, it has precipitated 
the patent crisis. Ever-increasing numbers of ever-more complex filings are 
swamping patent offices. The old regime has not kept pace on critical points: 
efficiency and transparency.181 
There is a need for a systematic revision of the patent system, so that it 
reflects the collaborative, international character of large-scale research projects. 
Such patent criteria as novelty, inventive step, utility, and secret use should be 
recalibrated in light of the global nature of scientific inquiry in the field of 
genetics. 
IV VIRAL NETWORKS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT  
AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 
The race to patent the SARS virus has raised wider issues about patent law 
and access to essential medicines. There has been much discussion in 
international forums such as the WTO and the WHO about the circumstances in 
which national governments can invoke compulsory licensing provisions in 
public health epidemics and other national emergencies. Concerns have been 
raised about access to essential medicines in the context of disputes over AIDS 
drugs.182 There has been intense debate between stakeholders — patent holders 
in respect of pharmaceutical drugs and vaccines have been pitted against 
developing countries, generic drug manufacturers, and human rights and aid 
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agencies. There have also been similar issues raised in relation to patent law and 
infectious diseases, such as malaria, tuberculosis, and avian influenza.183 Alarms 
have been also raised about access to anti-anthrax pharmaceutical drugs in the 
event of bio-terrorism.184 There are important lessons to be learned from the 
outbreak of public health epidemics and national emergencies. 
The race to patent the SARS virus provides a new lens through which to 
consider access to essential medicines. There have been fears expressed that 
prospective patent holders might prevent or limit access to diagnostics, vaccines 
and pharmaceutical drugs which are being developed by commercial companies 
to address the SARS virus. A number of commentators have drawn parallels 
between the search for the SARS virus and the hunt for HIV. Seth Shulman 
regrets that the race to patent HIV jeopardised medical and scientific research: 
‘There is no question that the fighting consumed time that could have been spent 
trying to combat the disease’.185 Peter Yu draws hedged comparisons between 
the SARS virus epidemic and the issues over access to HIV/AIDS drugs:  
HIV/AIDS drugs have created serious tension between developed and less 
developed countries. SARS has not yet reached the same level as the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. Nor is it as widespread. Hopefully, it never will be. Still, if it remains a 
recurring and potentially lethal disease, SARS drugs will be profitable, and 
affordable access to these drugs will become a major concern — and perhaps a 
reasonable fear — for the future. What if SARS drugs are as unaffordable and 
inaccessible as HIV/AIDS drugs? Will less developed countries have the 
technological capacity to develop and produce SARS drugs they need? Will the 
global patent system be able to strike the balance between research and 
development initiatives and consumer costs?186 
Yu concludes that ‘whether we can prevent a SARS crisis and maintain a 
desirable international patent system will depend on whether we have fully 
learned these lessons’.187 
There could, of course, be debate about whether drawing such parallels 
between the SARS virus and HIV/AIDS crisis are appropriate. Some might 
object that such comparisons are tenuous, and it is premature to make such 
predictions, given that patents have only been recently filed in respect of the 
SARS virus. However, a good case can be made that such concerns are 
reasonable. Hopefully, the policy of ‘defensive patenting’ by public research 
institutions will promote access to the genetic sequence of the SARS virus. 
Nonetheless, concerns remain that ‘defensive patenting’ can also be used to 
block access to essential technology. In any case, it will be difficult for public 
research institutions to guarantee access to downstream technologies. There is an 
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array of organisations and commercial companies developing a range of 
diagnostics, vaccines and pharmaceutical drugs to combat the SARS virus.188 
Biotechnology companies and pharmaceutical drug manufacturers have 
expressed a desire to exploit any patents on such products in order to recoup 
research and development costs. There are strong commercial imperatives to 
control access to such essential tests and medicines. It would be complacent to 
disregard such natural entrepreneurial instincts. It is therefore prudential to 
ensure that the international patent system facilitates access to any future tests 
and medicines in respect of the SARS virus. 
A The World Trade Organization 
The WTO has been a key collective actor in the debate over patent law and 
access to essential medicines.189 The TRIPS Agreement requires WTO Members 
to establish minimum standards for protecting and enforcing intellectual property 
rights.190 Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement declares:  
Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and regulations, adopt 
measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the 
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and 
technological development, provided that such measures are consistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement. 
The TRIPS Agreement contains a number of provisions designed to promote 
the public interest in the field of public health. It allows governments to provide 
for exceptions, exclusions and limitations to rights, such as in the case of 
national emergencies, public non-commercial use, or remedying anti-competitive 
practices. This can be done, for example, in the form of compulsory licensing, 
exhaustion regimes and other types of exceptions, provided certain conditions 
are fulfilled. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
affirmed that WTO members could take measures to protect public health and 
promote access to essential medicines.191 In particular, it recognised the gravity 
of the health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, 
especially those resulting from epidemics such as HIV/AIDS. The WTO reached 
further agreement on the implementation of para 6 of the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, which deals with compulsory licensing 
for member states without manufacturing capabilities. 
1 Scope of Diseases 
There has been some heated debate over the scope of the diseases which 
would be covered by the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health on access to essential medicines. Article 1 of the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health acknowledges: ‘We recognize the 
gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and  
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least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics’. Article 4 stresses:  
We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members 
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our 
commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all. In this connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to 
use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, which provide flexibility 
for this purpose. 
Article 5(c) recognises that ‘each Member has the right to determine what 
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency’ and 
it acknowledges ‘that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or 
other circumstances of extreme urgency’. 
Initially, the US argued that compulsory licensing should be restricted to a 
handful of infectious diseases — such as AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and ‘other 
epidemics of comparable gravity and scale’. On 20 December 2002, the US 
drafted a footnote dealing with trade of generic medicines to countries with little 
or no manufacturing capacity. It extended the scope of diseases to 22 infectious 
diseases:  
This decision applies to public health problems arising from yellow fever, plague, 
cholera, meningococcal disease, African trypanosomiasis, dengue, influenza, 
HIV/AIDS, leishmaniasis, TB, malaria, hepatitis, leptospirosis, pertussis, 
poliomyelitis, schistosomiasis, typhoid fever, typhus, measles, shigellosis, 
haemorrhagic fevers, and arboviruses and other epidemics of comparable gravity 
and scale including those that might arise in the future whether due to natural 
occurrence, accidental release or deliberate use.192 
The US was criticised for reneging on the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health, and acceding to the demands of major 
pharmaceutical drug companies — such as the Pfizer Corporation.193 
Significantly, the list of diseases failed to include many major public health 
problems in developing countries. 
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On 7 January 2003, the European Union offered a longer list of diseases that 
expanded upon the US footnote, and proposed a mechanism for review. It stated:  
This covers at least HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, yellow fever, plague, 
cholera, meningococcal disease, African trypanosomiasis, dengue, influenza, 
leishmaniasis, hepatitis, leptospirosis, pertussis, poliomyelitis, schistosomiasis, 
typhoid fever, typhus, measles, shigellosis, haemorrhagic fevers and arboviruses. 
When requested by a Member, the World Health Organization shall give its 
advice as to the occurrence in an importing Member, or the likelihood thereof, of 
any other public health problem.194 
In a report to the Cancún discussions of the WTO, Jean Bizet of France 
discussed the ambiguity of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and 
Public Health. He argued that the reference to ‘other epidemics’ in the text was 
vague, and open to competing interpretations amongst the member states: ‘In the 
French version, the word “épidémies” supports the notion of contagion while in 
English epidemics could also include diabetes or mental illness’.195 This 
linguistic criticism is unconvincing. The definition of ‘epidemics’ was always 
intended to be open-ended and Bizet’s focus on the etymology of the word 
‘epidemic’ is therefore unhelpful. 
The US and EU revised proposals have been supported by pharmaceutical 
drug companies and their allies. Robert Goldberg, the director of the Center for 
Medical Progress at the Manhattan Institute in New York, maintains that drug 
patents should not be overridden by compulsory licensing:  
The enemies of medical progress want to call a cease-fire in the war against 
human suffering. We can’t afford not to fight back. A host of afflictions — from 
depression to AIDS, from SARS to bioterrorism — continue to demand our 
attention. Policies that control prices, limit access, and weaken patent protection 
threaten us all.196 
The director argues that strong patent protection for pharmaceutical drugs is 
necessary to combat health emergencies — such as AIDS, SARS and 
bio-terrorism. 
The US and the EU have been criticised for their view that the scope of the 
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health should be 
restricted to a shortlist of diseases. Their position has come under attack from 
consumer groups, aid organisations and developing countries. Sanjay Basu 
comments on the conduct of the US Trade Representative (‘USTR’):  
At the top of a long list of ironies is the fact that the USTR’s list of diseases for 
which generic drugs can be produced excludes the severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) — which of course, didn’t exist publicly until after the USTR 
had produced his list. This highlights the importance of keeping the Doha 
Declaration in its original form — whereby health ministries can tackle an 
epidemic as it occurs rather than waiting for their populations to die and spread 
the disease to wealthier nations which have the generic manufacturing capacity to 
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actually control it (and this is particularly important in the case of SARS, for 
which genome components and potential therapeutic agents are already being 
patented).197 
In contrast, India has found favour with its position that a broad, open-ended 
definition of diseases should be adopted.198 Countries affected by the SARS 
virus such as Singapore have supported this stance: ‘The spreading killer flu 
made it imperative for authorities to make medicines accessible at reasonable 
prices’.199 The emergence of avian influenza also reinforced the need for an 
open-ended definition of infectious diseases. 
2 Export of Pharmaceutical Drugs 
Article 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health provides:  
We recognize that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing 
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective 
use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council 
for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this problem and to report to the 
General Council before the end of 2002. 
In the lead up to the Cancún meeting on 30 August 2003, WTO member 
governments reached an agreement on the implementation of para 6 of the Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. This paragraph calls 
for a solution to compulsory licensing for member states without manufacturing 
capabilities.200 The agreement allows any member country to export 
pharmaceutical products made under compulsory licences within the terms set 
out in the decision. All WTO member countries are eligible to import under this 
decision, but 23 developed countries are listed in the decision as announcing 
voluntarily that they will not use the system to import. The decision covers 
patented products or products made using patented processes in the 
pharmaceutical sector, including active ingredients and diagnostic kits. 
In November 2003, the new Canadian Prime Minister, Paul Martin, 
announced the introduction of a new Bill to provide low cost drugs to fight AIDS 
in developing countries. He dubbed the legislation, the ‘Jean Chrétien Pledge to 
Africa Act’,201 to honour his predecessor’s initiatives in that area. Martin 
observed:  
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The world needs our values. The world needs us now. That is why we will be the 
first country in the world with legislation to open the door to increased export and 
production of patented medicines to help people suffering from HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and TB, among other diseases, in the developing world.202 
This statute amends the Patent Act203 and the Food and Drugs Act204 ‘to 
facilitate access to pharmaceutical products to address public health problems 
afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially those 
resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics’.205 These 
amendments were introduced to implement para 6 of the Doha Declaration on 
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. The legislation was passed by the 
Canadian Parliament and received Royal Assent in May 2004. 
It would be interesting to see whether this legislation could be invoked in the 
wake of another public health epidemic in respect of the SARS virus. If so, 
pharmaceutical drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics being developed in relation to 
the SARS virus could be exported to developing countries in such circumstances. 
B The World Health Organization 
The WHO has been instrumental in coordinating the international network of 
research on the SARS virus. It has emphasised the need for collaboration 
between the network participants. The WHO presented the containment of the 
SARS virus as ‘one of the biggest success stories in public health in recent 
years’.206 However, it was less active in the debate over patent law and public 
health epidemics. The 56th World Health Assembly considered the relationship 
between intellectual property, innovation and public health. It stressed  
that in order to tackle new public health problems with international impact, such 
as the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), access to new 
medicines with potential therapeutic effect, and health innovations and 
discoveries should be universally available without discrimination.207  
However, there was much disagreement amongst the member states as to 
what measures would be appropriate. The WHO has made a number of 
aspirational statements about patent law and access to essential medicines. 
Arguably, though, the organisation could be a much more informed and vocal 
advocate. 
Initially, the WHO did not view the patent issues related to SARS as being 
within its field of activities. The agency did not even seem aware of the patent 
proceedings, leaving individual research institutions without guidance. 
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Spokesman Dick Thompson said: ‘What we care about is [that] the international 
collaboration continues to function. Patents, they don’t really concern us’.208 
The director of WHO’s Global Influenza project, Klaus Stöhr, expressed his 
opinion that the patent filings would not interfere with the international 
cooperation on the SARS research: ‘I don’t think this will undermine the 
collaborative spirit of the network of labs’.209 However, he believed that, after 
the international network of researchers had identified the coronavirus, it was 
necessary to rely upon companies to commercialise such research. Klaus Stöhr 
conceded: ‘At a certain point of time you have to give way for competitive 
pharmaceutical companies’.210 
On a policy front, the WHO remained deferential to the WTO over the debate 
over patent law and access to essential medicines, observing: 
Owing to the inconclusive nature of the studies conducted to date, and because of 
the effect that potentially significant price increases could have on access to drugs 
in poor countries, WHO is currently monitoring and evaluating the effects of 
TRIPS on the prices of medicines. It is also monitoring the TRIPS impact on 
other important issues such as transfer of technology, levels of research and 
development for drugs for neglected diseases, and the evolution of generic drug 
markets.211 
In such a statement, the WHO appears diffident, unwilling to take on more 
than a spectator role. Such a position is arguably too timid, given the gravity of 
national emergencies, such as the SARS virus. The organisation could take a 
much stronger stance on the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on public health 
concerns.  
The WHO has since enunciated a position statement on the patenting of the 
SARS virus. A number of high ranking officials from the organisation have 
commented on the need to ensure that international research into the SARS virus 
is not impeded by competition over patents. Arguably though, the WHO should 
not be limited to a mere spectator role in such policy discussions. It needs to play 
an active advocacy role in the debate over patent law and access to essential 
medicines. The WHO released a position statement on ‘Patent Applications for 
the SARS Virus and Genes’ on 29 May 2003.212 The organisation stressed that it  
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had no per se objection to the patenting of the SARS virus:  
Some people have objected to the SARS patent applications on the ground that 
the virus and its genes should not be patentable because they are mere discoveries, 
not inventions. This distinction no longer prevents the granting of patents; the 
novel claim rests not with the virus itself but with its isolation, and likewise with 
the identification of the genetic sequence not its mere occurrence. Many patents 
have been issued on viruses and genetic sequences, though the appropriate 
policies to follow in such cases — particularly as genomic sequencing becomes 
more routine and less ‘inventive’ — remain matters of dispute.213 
Furthermore, it recognised that public institutions could legitimately use 
patents as a defensive means to prevent undue commercial exploitation of the 
research:  
The “defensive” use of patents can be a legitimate part of researchers’ efforts to 
make their discoveries (and further discoveries derived therefrom) widely 
available to other researchers, in the best collaborative traditions of biomedical 
science.214 
The WHO affirmed the need for further cooperation between research 
organisations in respect of the SARS virus: ‘For continued progress against 
SARS, it is essential that we nurture the spirit of the unprecedented, global 
collaboration that rapidly discovered the novel virus and sequenced its 
genome’.215 The WHO announced its intention to monitor the effects of patents 
(and patent applications) on the speed with which SARS diagnostic tests, 
treatments, and vaccines are developed and made available for use, and on the 
manner in which prices are set for these technologies. It observed:  
In the longer term, the manner in which SARS patent rights are pursued could 
have a profound effect on the willingness of researchers and public health 
officials to collaborate regarding future outbreaks of new infectious diseases. 
WHO will therefore examine whether the terms of reference for such 
collaborations need to be modified to ensure that the credit for any intellectual 
property developed is appropriately attributed, that revenues derived from 
licensing such property are devoted to suitable uses, and that legitimate rewards 
for innovative efforts do not impose undue burdens on efforts to make tests, 
therapies, and preventive measure available to all.216 
However, the WHO expressed no opinion as to whether there should be any 
immediate reforms. 
1 The 56th World Health Assembly 
The 56th World Health Assembly217 considered a report on ‘Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health’ prepared by the Secretariat of the  
                                                 
 213 WHO, Patent Applications for SARS, above n 212. 
 214 Ibid. 
 215 Ibid. 
 216 Ibid. 
 217 WHO, Fourth Report of Committee A (Draft), above n 207, 3–4. 
2004] The Race to Patent the SARS Virus  
 
WHO.218 It maintained 
that in order to tackle new public health problems with international impact, such 
as the emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), access to new 
medicines with potential therapeutic effect, and health innovations and 
discoveries should be universally available without discrimination.219  
The Assembly requested that  
the Director-General continue to support Member States in the exchange and 
transfer of technology and research findings, according high priority to access to 
antiretroviral drugs to combat HIV/AIDS and medicines to control tuberculosis, 
malaria and other major health problems, in the context of paragraph 7 of the 
Doha Declaration which promotes and encourages technology transfer.220 
The WHO also considered a report on the emergence of the SARS virus and 
the international response to the infectious disease.221 It was ‘deeply concerned 
that SARS ... poses a serious threat to global health security, the livelihood of 
populations, the functioning of health systems, and the stability and growth of 
economies’.222 The Committee on Infectious Diseases requested that the 
Director-General ‘mobilize global scientific research to improve understanding 
of the disease and to develop control tools such as diagnostic tests, drugs and 
vaccines that are accessible to and affordable by Member States’.223  
The Director-General of the WHO, Dr Gro Harlem Brundtland, told the 
World Health Assembly that there was a need to build trust and forge solidarity 
in the face of public health epidemics: ‘Ensuring that patent regimes stimulate 
research and do not hinder international scientific cooperation is a critical 
challenge — whether the target is SARS or any other threat to human health’.224 
Similarly, Dr Marie-Paule Kieny, Director of the WHO Initiative for Vaccine 
Research, said:  
If we are to develop a SARS vaccine more quickly than usual, we have to 
continue to work together on many fronts at once, on scientific research, 
intellectual property and patents issues, and accessibility. It is a very complicated 
process, involving an unprecedented level of international cooperation, which is 
changing the way we work.225 
She emphasised that patents and intellectual property issues and their safeguards 
can help rather than hinder the rapid development of SARS vaccines and ensure 
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that, once developed, they are available in both industrialised and developing 
countries.226 
C Summary 
The WHO should play a much more active role in the policy debate over 
patent law and access to essential medicines. James Love, the director of the 
Consumer Project on Technology, run by Ralph Nader, is critical of the WHO 
statement on ‘Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health’.227 He 
maintains that the Assembly could have addressed ‘practical examples, like 
SARS’ and cites the report in The Washington Post that notes that a number of 
commercial companies are investing in SARS research.228 The non-government 
organisation Médecins Sans Frontières has been critical in the past of the passive 
role played by the WHO in the debate over access to essential medicines: ‘As the 
world’s leading health agency, and armed with the clear mandate of recent 
World Health Assembly resolutions, the WHO can and should do much 
more’.229 The WHO should become a vocal advocate for public health concerns 
at the WTO and its TRIPS Council — especially in relation to patent law and the 
SARS virus. It must staunchly defend the rights of member states to incorporate 
measures in their legislation that protect access to medicines — such as 
compulsory licensing, parallel imports, and measures to accelerate the 
introduction of generic pharmaceutical drugs. It needs to develop a clearer vision 
on global equity pricing for essential medicines. 
V CONCLUSION 
The race to patent the SARS virus seems to be an inefficient means of 
allocating resources. A number of public research organisations — including the 
BCCA, the CDC and HKU — were compelled to file patents in respect of the 
genetic coding of the SARS virus. Such measures were promoted as ‘defensive 
patenting’ — a means to ensure that public research and communication were 
not jeopardised by commercial parties seeking exclusive private control. 
However, there are important drawbacks to such a strategy. The filing of patents 
by public research organisations may be prohibitively expensive. It will also be 
difficult to resolve the competing claims between the various parties — 
especially given that they were involved in an international research network 
together. Seth Shulman argues that there is a need for international cooperation 
and communication in dealing with public health emergencies such as the SARS 
virus:  
The success of a global research network in identifying the pathogen is an 
example of the huge payoff that can result when researchers put aside visions of 
patents and glory for their individual laboratories and let their work behave more 
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like, well, a virus. After all, the hallmark of an opportunistic virus like the one 
that causes SARS is its ability to spread quickly. Those mounting a response need 
to disseminate their information and innovation just as rapidly.230 
There is a danger that such competition for patent rights may undermine trust 
and cooperation within the research network. Hopefully, however, such concerns 
could be resolved through patent pooling or joint ownership of patents. 
Furthermore, a number of commercial companies have filed patent applications 
in respect of research and development into the SARS virus. There will be a need 
for cooperation between the public and private sectors in developing genetic 
tests, vaccines, and pharmaceutical drugs that deal with the SARS virus. 
There is also a need to reform the patent system to deal with international 
collaborative research networks — such as that created to combat the SARS 
virus. Several proposals have been put forward. There has been a renewed debate 
over whether patents should be granted in respect of genes and gene sequences. 
Some commentators have maintained that the SARS virus should fall within the 
scope of patentable subject matter — to promote research and development in 
the field. However, a number of critics of genetic technology have argued that 
the SARS virus should not be patentable because it is a discovery of nature, and 
a commercialisation of life. There has been a discussion over the lack of 
harmonisation over the criteria of novelty and inventive step between patent 
regimes. As Peter Yu comments, ‘[w]hile [the] US system awards patents to 
those who are the first to invent, the European system awards patents to those 
who are the first to file an application’.231 There have been calls for the 
requirement of utility to be raised. There have also been concerns about prior art, 
secret use and public disclosure. Representative Lamar Smith of Texas has put 
forward the CREATE Act, which recognises the collaborative nature of research 
across multiple institutions. Such reforms are intended to ensure that the patent 
system is better adapted to deal with the global nature of scientific inquiry. 
The race to patent the SARS virus also raises important questions about 
international treaties dealing with access to essential medicines. The public 
health epidemic raises similar issues to other infectious diseases — such as 
AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, influenza, and so forth. The WHO made a public 
statement about its position on the patenting of the SARS virus. It has stated that 
it will continue to monitor developments in this field. Arguably, there is a need 
for the WHO to play a larger role in the debate over patent law and access to 
essential medicines. Not only could it mediate legal disputes over patents in 
respect of essential medicines, it could be a vocal advocate in policy discussions. 
The WTO has also played an important role in the debate over patent law and 
access to essential medicines. A number of public interest measures could be 
utilised to secure access to patents relating to the SARS virus including 
compulsory licensing, parallel importation and research exceptions. The 
appearance of the SARS virus shows that there should be an open-ended 
interpretation of the scope of diseases covered by the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health. 
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Important lessons should be learned from the emergence of the SARS virus, 
and the threat posed to global health. As the World Health Report 2003 notes:  
SARS will not be the last new disease to take advantage of modern global 
conditions. In the last two decades of the 20th century, new diseases emerged at 
the rate of one per year, and this trend is certain to continue. Not all of these 
emerging infections will transmit easily from person to person as does SARS. 
Some will emerge, cause illness in humans and then disappear, perhaps to recur at 
some time in the future. Others will emerge, cause human illness and transmit for 
a few generations, become attenuated, and likewise disappear. And still others 
will emerge, become endemic, and remain important parts of our human 
infectious disease ecology.232 
Already, in 2004, there have been worries that pharmaceutical drug 
companies and patent rights are impeding efforts to prevent an outbreak of bird 
flu — avian influenza.233 There is a need to ensure that the patent system is 
sufficiently flexible and adaptable to cope with the appearance of new infectious 
diseases.234 
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